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Abstract 
Granger and Sims non-causality (GSNC) are compared to non-causality based on concepts 
popular in the microeconometrics and programme evaluation literature (potential outcome 
non-causality, PONC). GSNC is defined as a set of restrictions on joint distributions of 
random variables with observable sample counterparts, whereas PONC combines 
restrictions on partially unobservable variables (potential outcomes) with different identifying 
assumptions that relate potential to observable outcomes. Based on a dynamic model of 
potential outcomes, we find that in general neither of the concepts implies each other 
without further assumptions. However, identifying assumptions of the sequential selection 
on observable type provide the link between those concepts, such that GSNC implies 
PONC, and vice versa.  
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One of the most important tasks of econometricians is to uncover causal relations between eco-
nomic variables and distinguish them from associational relationship, also called spurious corre-
lations. Only causal relations are useful for policy advice, because they contain the reaction of the 
economic variables of interest to policy interventions. In terms of the classical economic theorist 
like Marshall, or, more recently but in the same spirit, Hicks (1979), it is the effect of the ceteris 
paribus intervention that is of interest.
1 Econometrics developed two different ways to define 
what a causal effect is. One concept originated in time series econometrics. The other concept 
comes  from  the  sphere  of  microeconometrics  and  statistics.  Although  both  approaches  are 
frequently applied in their subfields, it seems that they are not yet well understood. 
The concept used in time series econometrics is due to Wiener (1956), Granger (1969) and Sims 
(1972) (e.g. see the review article by Geweke, 1984). Their basic idea is that (non-) causality is 
very similar, if not the same, than (non-) predictability. Therefore, they consider one variable not 
to cause another variable, if the current value of the causing variable does not help to predict 
future  values  of  the  variables  that  might  capture  the  effects  of  this  cause.  This  statement  is 
conditional on the information set available at each point in time. This concept is in principle 
(technically) applicable if one cross-sectional unit (e.g. a country) is observed for a sufficiently 
long period. 
                                                           
*  I am affiliated with ZEW, Mannheim, CEPR and PSI, London, and IZA, Bonn. I am thankful to Jim Heckman for 
convincing me to write down some of the issues that appear in this paper. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. 
I very much appreciate the previous joint work on dynamic potential outcome models with Ruth Miquel, in which 
we touched on a couple of issues that reappear here. The paper has been written while visiting the Economics 
Department of the University of Michigan. The hospitality is appreciated. 
1   See  the  excellent  account  of  these  writers  and  related  historical  developments  in  econometrics  by  Heckman 
(2000). 1 
The  alternative  concept  currently  very  popular  in  microeconometrics,  particularly  and  most 
explicitly in the programme evaluation literature (e.g. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999) is 
based on the idea that the relevant comparison is between different states of the world, each of 
which relates to a value of the causing variable. If causation is absent, then the outcomes that 
would have been realised if those potential states of the world had been true, would be the same. 
To relate this concept of different states of the world to data, it is necessary to observe different 
sample units in the different states. Then, so-called identifying assumptions are employed to 
relate the observed data to the distribution of the potential outcome variables, so that causal 
effects can be inferred from the 'real world' that is reflected in the data. The statistical formulation 
of the resulting inference problem is probably due to Neyman (1923) and was extended and 
popularized by Rubin (1974). Recently, dynamic versions of the potential outcome approach 
were suggested by Robins (1986) and Lechner and Miquel (2005). In principle, for this approach 
to be technically applicable there is no need to observe cross-sectional units over time as long as 
there is enough variation between units. 
Apparently, there is nothing specific to those concepts so that they should just be used either in 
the domain of micro- or time series econometrics. They are based on different general principles 
that may be applied to all types of data. In particular, when the data have a time as well as a 
cross-sectional dimension both approaches may be applied. In this case, the dynamic approach to 
potential outcomes provides a useful framework to compare both concepts on an equal footing, 
because it addresses heterogeneity issues that are a key concern in the microeconometric liter-
ature as well as dynamics that feature most prominent in the time series econometrics 
The literature appears to be almost silent on explicit comparisons of those concepts of causality. 
Heckman (2000) gives a historical account of causality in econometrics but does not attempt a 
formal comparison underlying both causality concepts. Holland (1986), in his overview of cau-2 
sality in different fields, briefly analyses Granger causality in a static model of potential out-
comes and shows an equivalence of the two concepts under a randomisation condition. The ex-
change between Granger (1986) and Holland (1986), part of the discussion of that paper, does not 
really clarify the distinguishing features either. 
The contribution of this paper is to fill that gap. We use the nonparametric dynamic model of 
potential  outcomes  to  analyse  the  differences  between  Granger-Sims  non-causality  and  non-
causality defined by potential outcomes. We find that in general neither of the concepts implies 
each  other  without  further  assumptions.  However,  identifying  assumptions  of  the  sequential 
selection on observable type provide the link between those concepts. Once they are added, non-
causality  based  on  the  Granger-Sims  definition  implies  non-causality  based  on  the  dynamic 
potential outcome version, and vice versa. Thus, if such assumptions are valid, then tests for zero 
causal effects could be based on both approaches. Moreover, the results of those tests could be 
interpreted using the different intuitions that are behind the different concepts. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the concepts of (non-) causality based on ob-
servable variables. Section 3 presents the causal model based on potential outcomes in its dy-
namic form and discusses identification assumption. Section 4 relates those concepts to each 
other and Section 5 concludes. 
2  Causality based on observable outcomes: Wiener-Granger-Sims non-
causality 
Let  us  define  two  stochastic  processes  { } t D D =   and  { } t Y Y =   that  may  not  necessarily  be 
stationary. The data available consist of a random sample  0 1 ( , ,..., , i i Ti d d d   0 1 , ,..., ) i i Ti y y y  coming 
from independent and identical draws (i=1, …, N) from the random variables within some time 3 
window of those processes  0 1 0 1 ( , ,..., , , ,..., ) T T D D D Y Y Y . The question is whether the factors de-
scribed by D are causing changes in the variable Y. To set the terminology, we call Y the outcome 
variable (measuring the effect) and D the causing variable or treatment variable. The latter term is 
common in the biometric and econometric evaluation literature. 
In its original article Granger (1969, p. 428) explains his concept of causation as "We say that Dt 
is causing Yt+1 if we are better able to predict Yt+1 using all available information than if the in-
formation apart from Dt had been used." (notation adjusted; italics added). He distinguishes be-
tween instantaneous causality, when the value of Yt+1 can better be predicted with the value of Dt 
given the history of Dt then without it. In a similar fashion, he considers the case when it takes 
some periods until the effect manifests itself in the outcome variables. With a similar concept in 
mind, Sims (1972, p. 545) explains that "… if causality runs from D to Y only, future values of D 
in the regression [of Y on D and perhaps other 'exogenous' variables] should have zero coeffi-
cients". Furthermore, they also held the view that a cause must precede any effect of it. Initially, 
the formalization of these concepts used linear predictors.
2 In this context, Hosoya (1977) showed 
the equivalence of those two concepts (see also Florens and Mouchart, 1985). 
Chamberlain  (1982),  Florens  and  Mouchart  (1982)  and  Engle,  Hendry,  and  Richard  (1983) 
strengthened them by basing the definitions on properties of conditional distribution functions 
instead.  This  has  the  virtue  that  the  definitions  become  relevant  for  all  type  of  economic 
variables, whether they are related by a linear conditional mean or not. In this paper, we adopt 
this specification as well. To condense notation the history from period 1 to t of D and Y are 
denoted  by  1 ( ,..., ) t t D D D =   and  1 ( ,..., ) t t Y Y Y = .  The  initial  conditions  are  collected  in 
                                                           
2   In those times, econometrics was almost entirely concerned with the estimation of linear relations of continuous 
variables.  4 
0 0 0 ( , ) A D Y = . Furthermore, letting small letters denote specific values of the random variables 
Definition 1 gives the technical concept of non-causality: 
Definition 1 (GNSC: Granger-Sims non-causality): 
t D  does not GS-cause  1 t Y + , if and only if  1 0 0 0 | , ; ; ; 1,..., 1. t t t t t Y D Y y A a y a t T + = = ∀ ∀ ∀ = − ∐
3 
Note that we slightly deviate from the Chamberlain notation and condition directly on the random 
variables of the first period observed in the data (initial conditions), as in Engle, Hendry and 
Richard (1983).
4 The reason is notational simplicity in the comparison of the concepts of causal-
ity later on. Similarly, further delays of cause and effect can be introduced but are an unnecessary 
complication for the purpose of this paper.
5 
Sims (1972) proposed an alternative, but similar definition of non-causality, which in its inde-
pendence version, proposed by Chamberlain (1982), is given by  1 ( ,..., ) | T t t t Y Y D Y + ∐ . It is direct 
to see that it is implied by Definition 1 (but not vice versa). Although, it has some intuitive appeal 
as absence of correlation of a current intervention and future outcomes given past outcomes, am-
biguity about the causal meaning comes from not conditioning on the past interventions D (which 
is equivalent of assuming independence of Dt but not of  t D ). Whereas generally in this paper we 
focus on the (full) effect of D on Y, the Sims definition only seems to capture part of that, par-
ticularly so when the time horizon is finite, as will be assumed here. The lagged effects of the 
                                                           
3   1 2 ( , )| A B B C c = ∐  means that A and the elements of B are jointly independent conditional on C taking a value 
of c (i.e. Dawid, 1979). This statement is equivalent to  1 2 1 2 ( , , | ) ( | ) ( , | ) F A B B C c F A C F B B C c = = = . 
4   Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) discuss the related, but not identical concepts of strict exogeneity. Since their 
discussion focuses on likelihood functions and the role of their parameters in efficient and consistent estimation, it 
does not lend itself directly to the desired comparison of different concepts of causality. 
5   Dufour and Renault (1998) study long as distinguished from short run causality in a linear model by considering 
different lag lengths between the outcome variable and the causing and conditioning variables. 5 
intervention may be 'absorbed' in the conditioning set.
6 Thus, for the sake of brevity, we do not 
consider the Sims (1972) version explicitly. Instead, we chose the name of Granger-Sims non-
causality for the relation stated in Definition 1 to give credit to both 'inventors' of this type of 
causality. 
Letting F(.) denote a distribution function and using short hand notation for the conditioning val-
ues, then Definition 1 is equivalent to  1 0 ( | , , ) t t t F D Y Y A + =  0 ( | , ) t T F D Y A =   0 ( | , ) t t F D Y A , i.e. the 
distribution of  t D  and its elements does not depend on future outcomes conditional on the history 
of the process. Therefore, the joint distribution of all random variables has the following expres-
sion: 
0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1
( , | ) ( | , ) ( | )
( | , , ) ( | , )
( | , , ) ( | , ).
T T T T T
T T
t t T t t
t t
T T
t t t t t
t t
F D Y A F D Y A F Y A
F D D Y A F Y Y A











Furthermore, we have  1 0 ( | , , ) t t t F Y Y D A + =  1 0 ( | , ) t t F Y Y A +  for all t. These conditions have many 
obvious implications on sample counterparts, which can be used for testing them. 
                                                           
6   Chamberlain (1982) suggests an alternative and stronger version of the Sims's definition, which leads to the 
equivalence  with  the  Granger  definition  in  this  context.  This  equivalence  holds,  as  long  as  all  conditioning 
variables are treated symmetrically, i.e. as long as they can be subsumed in Y. Dufour and Tessier (1993) seem to 
be  the  first  to  note  this  non-equivalence  between  the  Granger  and  Sims  definition  when  additional  'control' 
variables are present which are influenced by D but are for some reason not included in Y. Their analysis is 
however confined to a linear projection framework. The formulation of this non-equivalence result in terms of 
independence is contained in Angrist and Kuersteiner (2004). 6 
3  Causal effects defined by potential outcomes: Marshal-Neyman-Rubin 
causality 
3.1  The concept of causality based on potential outcomes 
The approach of potential outcomes has its roots in the idea that a causal effect is a reaction of an 
outcome variable to a manipulation of another variable keeping other factors constant. In eco-
nomics, this classical ceteris paribus condition is the cornerstone of economics analysis.
7 The 
factors kept constant in such an intellectual exercise are typically those that are not influenced by 
the intervention but may influence the outcomes. Typically, this is really an intellectual exercise, 
i.e. a thought experiment, because it requires to imagine how the world would have developed 
had the specific intervention happened / or not happened. Therefore, additional conditions are 
required before the data can be used for resolving the causal question. The statistical formulation 
is probably due to Neyman (1923), Wilks (1932), Cochran and Chambers (1965), and has been 
highly popularized by the works of Rubin (1974, 1977, etc.; see also the non-technical overviews 
contained in Heckman, 2000, or Rubin, 2005). 
To simplify notation, consider a discrete intervention changing the causing variable D from d to 
d'. d and d' differ at least once between 1 and T-1. We are interested in the question whether the 
outcomes would change due to a change in D. As before, we entertain the notion that the cause 
must precede its effect. To capture the notion of a c.p. change, we define the outcomes as func-
tions of d as well as of other factors u and compare their difference for different values of d and 
the same value of u. We are interested in the contrast between Y(d',u) and Y(d,u). It has become 
                                                           
7   See, for example, the classical works by Marshall (1961) and others, as discussed in the historical account of 
causal analysis by Heckman (2000), or the extensive discussion of ceteris paribus causality provided by Hicks 
(1979). Furthermore, Heckman (2005) provides an elaborate discussion of the potential outcome model and how it 
can be imbedded in economic theory. 7 
common to be interested in differences of those potential outcomes (Y(d',u) and Y(d,u)), instead 
of other functions that may be more difficult to analyze.
8  
Let  us  define  a  causal  effect  of  t D   on  1 t Y +   given  initial  conditions  as 
1 1 1 ( ', , ) [ ( ', )] [ ( , )] t t t t t t t t t t d d u F Y d u F Y d u θ + + + = − . Note that this definition is based on a difference 
of distribution functions instead of the distribution of the differences of the potential outcomes as 
it would be common in that literature. The reasons are twofold: Firstly, the second concept is 
merely  an  illusion  for  any  other  measure  than  the  sample  mean  for  which  the  mean  of  the 
difference equals the difference of the means of the marginal distributions. It has (almost) never 
been applied in (non- or semiparametric) empirical studies. The reason is that there cannot be any 
information  in  the  data  useful  for  nonparametric  estimation  of  the  joint  distribution  of  the 
potential outcomes, because no unit can be observed in both states at the same time.
9 Secondly, 
comparing marginal distributions of potential outcomes is more suited for a comparison with the 
concept of GSNC and does not distract attention to an issue irrelevant in econometric practice. 
Assume that there is no data available on u. The case when some components of u are observable 
will be considered below. Therefore, only effects averaged over some population may be esti-
mated  from  the  data,  like,  1 1 0 ( ', , ) [ ( ', , )| , ]
t
t t t t t t t t t t u d d S E d d u u S A θ θ + + = ∈   = 
{ } 1 0 [ ( ', )| , ]
t
t t t t t u E F Y d u u S A + ∈ −  { } 1 0 [ ( , )| , ]
t
t t t t t u E F Y d u u S A + ∈ , where St denotes some population 
                                                           
8   Y(d',u) and Y(d,u) are called potential outcomes, because the world cannot be in two different states at any time. 
Therefore, only Y(d',u) or Y (d,u) is observed if one of those two states is realised at all. For a fierce attack on such 
a concept of causality from the statistical side, see for example Dawid (2000). Despite that, this concept appears to 
be widely used in the sciences and economics, and at least in applied microeconometrics. For a further discussion, 
see the excellent exposition of the potential outcome approach by Holland (1986). 
9   For attempts to bound effects that are based on the joint distribution, see Heckman, Smith, and Clemens (1997). 
However, their bounds turn out to be that large as to be only of very limited, if any, relevance in empirical 
applications. 8 
of interest defined by ut.
10 There is an issue here whether non-causality should mean that the 
causal effect is zero for every value of ut (i.e.  1( ', , ) 0 t t t t d d u θ + = ), or just on average for some 
population. The treatment effect literature places much emphasis on the fact that effects may dif-
fer in subpopulations defined by D. However, GSNC is formulated as a condition for the popula-
tion as a whole, conditional on initial conditions. Therefore, we will only consider average effects 
for the population, denoted by  1( ', ) 0 t t t d d θ + = , to allow a comparison that focuses on the key 
components of different concepts of causality. This means that non-causality in all concepts al-
low for negative and positive effects at the disaggregated level as long as they wash out for the 
population. Finally, it should be pointed out that for notational simplicity, this notion suppresses 
the dependence of the effect on the initial conditions  0 A . 
Definition 2 (potential outcome non-causality, PONC): 
t D  does not PO-cause Yt+1 if and only if  1( ', ) 0, ' , 1,..., 1. t t t t t d d d d t T θ + = ∀ ≠ ∀ = −  
This notation adapts to Granger's convention with respect to timing of cause and effect. There is a 
major conceptional difference to the approach presented in the previous section, namely that in 
the potential outcome approach the definition of the effect and its discovery from the data are two 
                                                           
10  ut may contain past values of u, but this is suppressed for notational convenience. This notation covers all the 
usual causal effects that appear in the literature, like average treatment effects, average treatment effects on the 
treated, local average treatment effects, marginal treatment effects, quantile treatment effects, etc. For an overview 
of all the different effects discussed in the applied microeconometric literature and an attempt to put them in a 
unified  framework,  see  Heckman  and  Vytlacil  (2005).  The  emphasis  on  effect  heterogeneity  for  different 
populations  that  appear  in  many  applied  studies  based  on  the  potential  outcome  approach  does  not  appear 
prominently in GSNC. This is probably due to their different origins and fields of application. The potential 
outcome  approach  is  used  frequently  in  fields  in  which  cross-sectional  effect  heterogeneity  is  considered 
important and the data have a large cross-sectional dimension. Granger-Sims non-causality originates from the 
time series literature, which historically is much less concerned with heterogeneity of causal effects and frequently 
has to rely on only one draw from the population of interest. 9 
distinct steps that are considered separately Therefore, the quantity defined in Definition 2 cannot 
be empirically tested without further assumptions. The microeconometric literature has discussed 
numerous ways to identify these causal effects from the data when there are other variables avail-
able. To concentrate our analysis on the key conceptional differences between the two definitions 
of non-causality, we consider the case without further variables other than D and Y. 
3.2  A form of potential outcome causality that can be inferred from the data 
The first link of the observed outcome variables to the potential outcomes is the fact that potential 
outcomes are observed for the value of dt that is realized in the data (dti). This is to say that the 
distribution of the observable outcome conditional on treatment is the same as the distribution of 
the  potential  outcome  related  to  that  treatment  and  conditional  on  it  ( 1 0 [ | , ] t t t F Y D d A + = = 
1 0 [ ( )| , ] t t t t F Y d D d A + = ).
11 In the so-called treatment effect literature, this connection is rational-
ized by the so-called observation rule that can be stated as  1 1 1( ) ( )
t
t t t t t
d
Y D d Y d + + = = ∑ , where 1() ⋅  
denotes the indicator function which is one when the element in the brackets is true.  
Even with the observation rule, we still cannot relate this concept of non-causality to data. For 
example,  the  observed  variables  can  never  uncover  an  effect  like  1 0 [ ( ')| , ] t t t t F Y d D d A + = −  
1 0 [ ( )| , ] t t t t F Y d D d A + = .  Although  the  second  term  in  the  difference  relates  to  observables 
(because  it  concerns  the  population  that  is  actually  observed  in  that  state,  thus 
1 0 [ ( )| , ] t t t t F Y d D d A + = =  1 0 [ | , ] t t t F Y D d A + = ), the first one does not. Therefore, assumptions are 
required to relate terms like  1 0 [ ( ')| , ] t t t t F Y d D d A + =  to random variables for which realizations 
                                                           
11  For the sake of a compact notation, the dependence of outcomes and treatments on ut is left implicit for most of 
this and the following sections. In such cases, ut is integrated out with respect to some distribution, which is 
obvious from the specific context. 10 
can be found in the data, namely elements of  0 ( , , ) T T Y D A . Robins (1986), and Lechner and 
Miquel (2005) analyzed such conditions in similar dynamic causal frameworks based on potential 
outcomes.
12  The  former  is  more  geared  towards  applications  in  epidemiology  and  contains 
assumptions, notation, and causal effects that are not commonly used in econometrics. Therefore, 
our  considerations  are  based  on  a  simplified  version  of  the  econometric  dynamic  treatment 
framework suggest by the latter authors. 
Within that framework, we formulate conditions that allow to infer some of the  1( ', ) t t t d d θ +  from 
the data. Without other data than the realizations from  0 ( , , ) T T Y D A , the only way to achieve non-
parametric  point  identification  of  an  average  causal  effect  is  to  assume  randomization,  i.e. 
whether unit 'i' is observed or not, subject to regime d or d', is random. We present three different 
types of such conditional and unconditional randomization assumptions: 
Assumption 1 (Full independence assumption, FIA) 
1 1 0 0 1 0 ( ) | ; ; . T T T T Y d D A a d a − − − = ∀ ∀ ∐  
FIA implies the value of dt, to which a specific unit is subject to in the next period, is random. 
Such an assumption would be valid in a classical experimental context, when the units are allo-
cated randomly to different regimes defined by the different values of  1 T d − . Using one period 
only, this is exactly the type of assumption Holland (1986) used for showing equivalence of 
GSNC and PONC. However, his equivalence result does not necessarily hold in the dynamic 
context. 
                                                           
12  These papers are based on so-called selection on observables assumption, which is the route followed below, 
although in a simplified way. Lechner (2004) proposes matching estimators and shows practical issues in Lechner 
(2006). Miquel (2002) considered the case of selection on unobservables that requires more data than just the 
outcomes and treatments. Abbring and Heckman (2005) provide a survey over dynamic causal models. 11 
Though, it may be more plausible that units (economic agents, …) use the information about the 
past as given by ( 1, t t D Y − ) to select the state  t D . This randomisation is conditional on the history 
of treatment and outcome variables. Thus, in period t different units of the population may have 
different probabilities to end up in dt, depending on their past realisations of the outcome and 
treatment variables. This assumption is called the weak conditional independence assumption: 
Assumption 2 (Weak dynamic conditional independence assumption, W-DCIA) 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 0
( ) | , ; ; ; ; 1,..., 1;
( ) | , , ; ; ; ; 2,..., ; 2,..., 1.
t t t
t t t t
Y d D Y y A a a d y t T
Y d D Y y D d A a a d y t t T τ τ τ τ τ τ
+
+ − −
= = ∀ ∀ ∀ ∀ = −




Lechner and Miquel (2005) show although population treatment effects are identified based on 
this assumption, classical treatment on the treated effects, i.e. the effects of the population of 
those units subject to a specific realisation of  1 T D −  are not identified. Thus, this assumption 
appears  as  a  weak  version  that  however  suffices  for  the  purpose  of  this  paper,  since  any 
equivalence results that can be obtained under this assumption will also hold under assumption 
that nest W-DCIA.
13 
Two  more  assumptions  are  necessary  to  use  the  data  together  with  W-DCIA  or  FIA  to  test 
PONC. Firstly, it is required that realisations of the outcome variables can actually be found for 
all paths of interest of  1 T D − . For W-DCIA, this so-called common support assumption must hold 
conditionally  on  past  outcomes,  for  FIA  it  must  hold  unconditionally.  Furthermore,  for  this 
notation  to  cover  a  ceteris  paribus  intervention,  it  is  necessary  to  require  that  the  potential 
outcomes for a specific state do not depend on the extent of the intervention. In other words, the 
                                                           
13  To identify all usual treatment effects, Lechner and Miquel (2005) suggest a more restrictive version of the W-
DCIA  by  imposing  additional  conditions  on  the  way  in  which  past  treatments  can  influence  past  observed 
outcomes (strong dynamic conditional independence assumption, S-DCIA).  12 
value of Y(d,u) does not depend on the fact that it is compared to Y(d',u) or to Y(d'',u). This is 
called the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), see Rubin (1980). In what follows, it 
is understood that SUTVA and the common support assumption hold.
14 Otherwise, the interpreta-
tion of both concepts, PONC and GSNC, changes. 
If FIA holds, then Property 1 shows how the causal effects can be recovered from the data. 
Property 1 (Causal effects with potential outcomes based on FIA) 
If FIA holds, the causal effects depend on  0 1 0 1 ( , ,..., , , ,..., ) T T D D D Y Y Y  as follows: 
1( ', ) t t t d d θ + =  1 0 0 1 0 0 ( | ', ) ( | , ) t t t t t t F Y D d A a F Y D d A a + + = = − = = ;  0 , '; ; . t t d d a t ∀ ∀ ∀  
The proof follows directly by combining FIA ( 1 0 [ ( )| ', ] t t t t F Y d D d A + = =   1 0 [ ( )| , ] t t t t F Y d D d A + = ) 
with the observation rule ( 1 0 [ ( )| , ] t t t t F Y d D d A + = =  1 0 [ | , ] t t t F Y D d A + = ). 
Property 2 (Causal effects with potential outcomes based on W-DCIA) 
If W-DCIA holds, the causal effects depend on  0 1 0 1 ( , ,..., , , ,..., ) T T D D D Y Y Y  as follows: 
1 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 | | , , | , ,
( )
[ ( )| ] ... ( | , , )
t t t t
t
t t t t t t t Y A Y D d Y A Y D d Y A
w d
F Y d A a E E E F Y D d Y y A a
− − −
+ + = = = = = = =
              
;  0 ; ; . t d a t ∀ ∀ ∀  
1( ', ) t t t d d θ + =
1 0
1 0 1 0 | [ ( ') ( | ', , ) ( ) ( | , , )] t t t t t t t t t t Y A E w d F Y D d Y A w d F Y D d Y A + + = − = ;  0 , '; ; . t t d d a t ∀ ∀ ∀  
The  proofs  of  these  properties  follow  directly  from  the  identification  proofs  of  Lechner  and 
Miquel (2005) and are not repeated here. 
                                                           
14  An example where SUTVA is violated would be the introduction of a large training programme changing the 
wages of nonparticipants as well as influencing demand and supply in the labour market. In this case, data of 
nonparticipants drawn from a world in which these programmes exist cannot proxy data from nonparticipants in a 13 
As can be seen from Property 2, identification is achieved by continuously reweighting the units 
that receive dt towards the distributions of characteristics that describes the population of interest. 
By doing so, the expanding number of conditioning variables and time order of variables is 
respected. 
4  Relation between the different concepts 
4.1  General results 
Note that Definition 1 summarizes the conditions that GSNC imposes on the data. Definition 2 
defines PONC. Properties 1 and 2 define how the PO-causal effects depend on the data if either 
of the 'identifying' Assumptions 1 or 2 holds. Hence, if GSNC together with those properties 
imply a zero causal effect ( 1( ', ) 0; , '; t t t t t d d d d t θ + = ∀ ∀ ), we conclude that GSNC together with the 
respective  Assumption  1  or  2  implies  PONC.  Conversely,  if  the  restrictions 
1( ', ) 0; , '; t t t t t d d d d t θ + = ∀ ∀  imposed on Properties 1 or 2 imply the restrictions of Definition 1, then 
we conclude that the combination of these assumptions with PONC implies GSNC. 
However, before considering the combinations of identifying assumptions with causality defini-
tions, we state the obvious in Theorem 1: 
Theorem 1 (GSNC and PONC only) 
a) GSNC does not imply PONC. 
b) PONC does not imply GSNC. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
world where this programme does not exist. Clearly, GSNC and PONC would fail to uncover the 'real' causal 
effect without further assumptions. 14 
This theorem is true, because PONC, without further assumptions, does not impose any restric-
tions on the distribution of  0 1 0 1 ( , ,..., , , ,..., ) T T D D D Y Y Y  that are of relevance to GSNC. 
This result may seem trivial. However, it points directly to the important fact that ceteris paribus 
interventions, which are directly reflected in models based on contrasts of outcomes in two dif-
ferent states of the world have no consequences for the data, if not enriched with further (untesta-
ble) assumptions. In other words, any restrictions put on the data (in the form of testable hypothe-
sis) are silent about underlying causal effects that generated the data if no further untestable as-
sumptions can be added to relate the potential worlds that are required to define effects of c.p. 
interventions to the data. 
Next, consider the experimental assumption (FIA), stating that potential outcomes and causing / 
treatment variables are independent. Again, we only get negative results in Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2 (GSNC and PONC combined with FIA) 
Suppose Assumption 1 (FIA) holds and there is common support. 
a) GSNC does not imply PONC. 
b) PONC does not imply GSNC. 
The reason for this non-equivalence is the fact that conditional independence does not imply un-
conditional independence and unconditional independence does not imply conditional independ-
ence. This is the so-called Simpson (1951) paradox. The Simpson paradox implies that all corre-
lations between two random variables may change when conditioned on further variables. 
More technically, combining Property 1 with Assumption 1 we see directly that PONC and FIA 
together imply that  1 0 0 ( | ', ) t t t F Y D d A a + = = =  1 0 0 ( | , ) t t t F Y D d A a + = = =  1 0 0 ( | ) t F Y A a + = , which 15 
is equivalent to  1 0 | t t Y D A + ∐ . This condition does not imply  1 0 | , t t t Y D Y A + ∐  (GSNC). Since the 
converse does not hold either, both parts of Theorem 1 hold. 
Theorem  3  shows  that  the  sequential  randomisation  assumption  W-DCIA  takes  care  of  the 
problem arising form Simpson's paradox by conditioning on the lagged outcome variables and 
thus provides the following equivalence results for the different concepts of causality. 
Theorem 3 (GSNC and PONC combined with W-DCIA) 
Suppose Assumption 2 (W-DCIA) holds and there is common support. 
a) GSNC implies PONC. 
b) PONC implies GSNC. 
GSNC implies that the distribution of Yt+1 given past outcomes does not depend on any of the 
past Dt,  1 0 1 0 ( | , , ) ( | , ) t t t t t t F Y D d Y A F Y Y A + + = = . This condition leads to an equality of the inner 
terms  of  the  causal  effects  given  in  Property  3,  i.e.  1 0 ( | ', , ) t t t t F Y D d Y A + = =  
1 0 ( | , , ) t t t t F Y D d Y A + = . Furthermore, because this equality holds for all values of t, the weights 
are identical as well ( ( ) ( ') t t w d w d = ). Therefore, GSNC implies PONC if W-DCIA holds. 
To show that PONC implies GSNC, it is important to note that W-DCIA comes with an initial 
condition, i.e. the problem of the first period is essentially static: 
2 1 1 ( ', ) d d θ =
1 0
!
2 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 | [ ( | ', , ) ( | , , )] 0
Y A E F Y D d Y A F Y D d Y A = − = = . 
Assuming that  1 0 ( | ) F Y A  is nonzero in the support of interest (as ensured by the common support 
assumption),  then  it  must  be  true  that  2 1 1 1 0 ( | ', , ) F Y D d Y A = =  2 1 1 1 0 ( | , , ) F Y D d Y A = .  This 16 
however has implication for the causal effect of the next period. Consider the zero causal effect 
for period 3: 
2 2 2 ( ', ) d d θ =
1 0 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 0
2 2
!
3 2 2 2 0 3 2 2 2 0 | | ', , | , ,
( ') ( )
[ ( | ', , ) ( | , , )] 0
Y A Y D d Y A Y D d Y A
w d w d
E E F Y D d Y A E F Y D d Y A
= = = − = =
                 
.  
However,  because  the  zero  causal  effect  from  the  previous  period  leads  to 
2 1 1 1 0 ( | ', , ) F Y D d Y A = =  2 1 1 1 0 ( | , , ) F Y D d Y A = ,  the  weights  appearing  in  the  difference  are  the 
same ( 2 2 ( ') ( ) w d w d = ). However, with nonzero weights guaranteed by common support, this 
condition on the weights implied by PONC and W-DCIA requires that  3 2 2 2 0 ( | ', , ) F Y D d Y A = − 
3 2 2 2 0 ( | , , ) 0 F Y D d Y A = = , which in turn implies that the weights for the next period are equal as 
well ( 3 3 ( ') ( ) w d w d = ). Applying this reasoning to every period up to period T, it follows that 
PONC  in  combination  with  W-DCIA  implies  1 0 ( | ', , ) t t t t F Y D d Y A + = =  1 0 ( | , , ) t t t t F Y D d Y A + = , 
which is exactly the condition for GSNC. Note that conditioning on some initial conditions as 
well as definition of zero effects in all periods, plays a key role in this proof. 
4.2  Further issues and generalisations  
This section takes up some issues that relate to simplifications chosen in this paper with the pur-
pose of clarifying the main differences between the different approaches. 
The first such issue relates to additional variables that could be used to condition on. All results 
hold in any subset defined by variables that are not influenced by treatment variables. Lechner 
and Miquel (2005) provide the necessary identification results when predetermined variables are 
added to Assumption 2.  17 
Another interesting type of data that might become available would be instrumental variables, i.e. 
variables that influence D but do not influence Y other than by changing D. In a world of hetero-
geneous causal effects that underlies this paper, such variables identify treatment effects for a 
subpopulation that react to changes in the instruments by changes in D, the so-called compliers 
(Imbens, Angrist, 1994). Which member of the population belongs to that group can however not 
be identified. Thus, since GSNC cannot be defined for such an unobservable subpopulation, there 
is not much sense in comparing GSNC and PONC for that group. 
In the comparison between GSNC and PONC, this paper considered PONC for the population 
instead of subpopulations for the treated. If the latter are explicitly taken into account, then for 
those effects that are actually identified, the results by Lechner and Miquel (2005) show that the 
structure of the key elements in the comparison, Properties 1 and 2, remain. 
5  Conclusion 
The paper highlights the problem to uncover the effects of ceteris paribus interventions with 
econometric methods. For a long time now, ceteris paribus interventions are typically thought of 
by economic theorists (like Marshall and Hicks as examples) as comparisons of different states of 
the world that could have occurred. The paper shows among that Granger-Sims non-causality 
under some conditions indeed detects the absence of such an effect. 
More precisely, we use the dynamic model of potential outcomes for analysing the differences 
between  Granger-Sims  non-causality  and  non-causality  defined  by  potential  outcomes  for 
different identifying assumptions. We find that in general neither of these concepts implies each 
other without further assumptions. However, identifying assumption of the sequential selection 
on observable type provide the link between those concepts. Once added, non-causality based on 
the  Granger-Sims  definition  implies  non-causality  based  on  the  dynamic  potential  outcome 18 
definition, and vice versa. Thus, if such untestable assumptions are plausible, then tests for zero 
causal effects could be based on both approaches. Moreover, the results of those tests could be 
interpreted using the different intuitions that are behind the different concepts. 
It is worthwhile noting that our findings are unrelated to the main criticism of the Granger-Sims 
approach  that  appeared  in  Holland  (1986)  as  well  as  in  other  papers.  The  issue  is  that  the 
availability of new data should lead to additional variables entering the information set. This in 
turn leads implicitly to a new definition of Granger-Sims non-causality. In other words, knowing 
more may lead to the result that a variable previously considered a cause becomes a spurious re-
lation. The potential outcome approach in comparison seems somehow immune to that problem, 
because the identification steps are separated from the estimation steps and the available data. 
However, the comparison is probably not entirely fair, because in the empirical practice, having 
new data leads many researchers to change their identifying assumptions by increasing the set of 
conditioning variables required for the DCIA assumptions to hold, and thus the same phenomena 
as for Granger-Sims-non-causality may appear. 
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